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Abstract 
 
ALLISON E. VOS: Falling Fertility Rates: New Challenges to the Welfare State 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
 
One of the biggest issues currently plaguing many advanced industrialized countries is the 
persistence of low fertility rates.  Decreasing fertility rates threaten economic growth, 
while government budgets have to accommodate more pension and health services as the 
number of adults of working age who contribute to older generations’ pensions 
diminishes.  I examine the determinants of fertility levels at the national level of seventeen 
OECD countries.  Specifically, I perform a pooled time series analysis covering the time 
period 1990-1999.  The analysis yields evidence that the types of state policies—active 
labor market programs, family-friendly policies, and employment protection laws—play 
a significant role in either helping or hindering fertility levels.  I find that Active Labor 
Market Policies and generous work and family policies encourage higher fertility rates, 
while the presence of Employment Protection Legislation—rules concerning hiring and 
firing—hinders the growth of fertility rates.   
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Introduction 
 
One of the biggest issues currently plaguing many advanced industrial countries is 
the persistence of low fertility rates.  In the European Union (EU), all member states have 
a fertility rate below 2.1, the rate necessary to replace the current population (Jenson 
2006).  In 2001, the fertility rate of the EU 25 (including the additional ten member states 
that would join the EU in 2004) was 1.46, while the range in the EU 15 (the fifteen 
member countries prior to enlargement in 2004) was from 1.89 (Ireland and France) to 
1.22 (Spain) (Jenson 2006).  The dilemma of low fertility stems from concern that the 
EU’s future—its very quality of life—is menaced by a failure of the population to replace 
itself.  Decreasing fertility rates threaten economic growth, while government budgets face 
the possibility of accommodating more pension and health services, as the number of 
adults of working age who contribute to older generations’ pensions—let alone who can 
provide care and support for older people—diminishes.   
For these reasons, I examine the determinants of fertility levels at the national 
level of seventeen OECD countries.  Specifically, I perform a pooled time series analysis 
using country-years as the unit of analysis, covering the time period 1990-1999.  The 
analysis yields evidence that the types of state policies—active labor market programs, 
family-friendly policies, and employment protection laws—play a significant role in 
either helping or hindering fertility levels.  I find that Active Labor Market Policies and 
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generous work and family policies encourage higher fertility rates, while the presence of 
Employment Protection Legislation—largely, rules concerning hiring and firing—hinders 
the growth of fertility rates.  The paper presents compelling evidence for differentiating 
between types of policies that either help or hinder population growth in advanced 
industrialized countries. 
 In addressing the issue of low fertility in Europe, we are inevitably confronted with 
a combination of institutional and human factors: while governments can attempt to put 
into place institutions and policies that will encourage childbirth (such as subsidies for 
children, family leave policies, and day care facilities), population reproduction is 
fundamentally a micro-level decision.  The bottom line is that women and men must 
choose to have children; no number of institutional configurations will by themselves 
result in the birth of babies.  Rather, it is the combination of systems of welfare 
provision, people’s ability to provide for their wellbeing, and the choice of women and 
men to conceive children, that will likely result in increased fertility rates across Europe.    
  
  
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
We are confronted with the question of just what encourages a rise in fertility 
levels, and why we have seen a drop in birthrates in the first place.  Until the women’s 
movement gained momentum in the 1970s, the dominant institutional family form in 
advanced industrial countries was the “male breadwinner model,” in which the man 
maintains outside employment while the woman’s domain was in the home, caring for 
children and performing household tasks like cleaning, cooking, and the like.  This family 
model was premised on the notion that there was a natural societal differentiation 
between men and women that required the man to be the provider and protector, and the 
woman to be the caregiver and reproducer (McDonald 2000).  The male breadwinner 
model dominated the high fertility period of the baby-boom era, in which women’s roles 
were relegated primarily to rearing children and maintaining the home.  Given little 
alternative, it is not difficult to see why women would bear multiple children: this was 
their “job.”    
 In today’s era, different societal institutions have distanced themselves successfully 
from the male breadwinner model and have moved in the direction of increased gender 
equity (McDonald 2000).  Especially in the realms of education and employment, the 
male breadwinner model is largely defunct: in most advanced industrial countries, women 
receive higher education in equal, if not greater, percentages than men, and through 
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initiatives like equal employment opportunity legislation, women suffer less 
discrimination in employment selection today than in previous eras (McDonald 2000).  
No longer limited to strict roles of “housewife” or “breadwinner,” women and men alike 
embody more diversity in their joint roles in the family and workplace.  However, with 
increased gender equity comes the challenge of balancing work and family life—a challenge 
which, as one hypothesis goes, may limit women’s real choices between children and 
employment, leading to low fertility (McDonald 2000).  In other words, women may 
have gained “false” gender equity in that while they may occupy more equitable roles 
with men in the public sphere, in the private sphere—i.e. life at home—they are faced 
with family roles that continue to constrain their choices. 
Furthermore, the structure of the family has changed over the decades.  By the 
1990s, marriage rates were low and/or declining, the mean age at first marriage and at first 
birth increased, and fertility dropped below the replacement rate of 2.1 (Council of 
Europe 2002).  Demographers distinguish between three levels of below-replacement 
fertility: 1) low fertility: at least 1.5 children per woman; 2) very low fertility: between 1.3 
and 1.5 children per woman; and 3) lowest low fertility: fewer than 1.3 children per woman 
(Billari and Kohler 2004; Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002).  In my study, I examine all 
three levels of fertility, ranging from southern Europe (Italy) and Germany at the lowest 
end of the fertility spectrum, to the medium-range (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland) to highest fertility levels (e.g. the Nordic countries, France, Ireland, the 
United States). 
 Examining fertility rates has yielded some clarification on previous hypotheses that 
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focused on relationships between levels of religiosity and fertility, and women’s labor 
force participation and fertility.  Countries with higher levels of religiosity and traditional 
(Catholic) family values, e.g. Spain and Italy, are in fact among the lowest fertility group 
(Billari 2004).  Moreover, the cross-country relationship between female participation 
rates and fertility rates has reversed its sign; the correlation between total fertility rates 
(TFR) and female participation rates (FPR) across developed countries was negative and 
strongly significant during the 1970s up to the early 1980s (Ahn and Mira 2002).  
However, beginning in the mid- to late 1980s, the correlation became positive and equally 
significant.  That is, as more women became gainfully employed, levels of fertility also 
rose.  Several scholars (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996; Hotz et al. 1997; Ahn and Mira 
2002) have posited a weakening link between female employment and fertility due to 
increased use of market childcare and the rising income effect of wages at high levels of the 
female wage.       
 
Gendering the welfare state dimension 
 
Although gender and the family were dimensions that were conspicuously absent 
from earlier welfare policy regime analyses of the 1980s (Orloff 1993), current theorizing 
about the welfare state recognizes the significance of relationships between states, 
markets, and families, and the impact of these on society (Esping-Andersen 1999; Korpi 
2000; Gornick and Meyers 2003).  Furthermore, analyses focusing on the ability of 
women to combine parenting and paid work have sought to evaluate how different welfare 
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states either enhance or limit women’s opportunities in this regard (Gornick and Meyers 
2003; Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997).   
Gender equity and the reversal in the 1980s of the negative relationship between 
female labor force participation and fertility levels—at the national level—became a 
source of great interest in the academic world (Ahn and Mira 2002; Brewster and 
Rindfuss 2000; Rindfuss et al. 2003).  According to McDonald (2000), the transition 
from high fertility to fertility merely at the replacement level follows from greater 
equality shared between men and women in families.  Gender equity promotes lower 
fertility by increasing the likelihood that women will have more alternatives to child-
rearing, thus securing for themselves alternative avenues to success, satisfaction, and 
position in society.   
Put another way, evolution of gender roles has increased the opportunity costs of 
mothers’ choices to refrain from entering the labor market: this is a point on which social 
demographers and economists agree, and for which substantial empirical evidence exists 
(Morgan and Taylor 2006).  However, as gender equity rises in individual-oriented 
institutions (i.e. education, the economy, politics), it may still remain low within the 
family or in policies aimed at impacting families (i.e. parental leave policies).  As a result, 
fertility can fall to very low levels, especially among societies that are characterized as 
being more patriarchal than others, i.e. Japan, Italy, Spain, while remaining closer to 
replacement levels in more gender-egalitarian societies, i.e. Scandinavia and the U.S. 
(Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Rindfuss et al. 2003).      
Rindfuss et al. (2003) find that the relationship between fertility rates and female 
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labor force participation varies across countries, with those countries that minimize the 
incompatibility between mother and work roles—i.e. facilitate the efforts of women who 
want to fill both roles—being more likely to see increasing numbers of working mothers.  
Countries in this group are likely to have higher proportions of females who are both 
employed and mothers, because women can more easily combine these two roles, than 
countries that do little to minimize the role incompatibility.  As Esping-Andersen (1990, 
1999) and others have pointed out, the institutions and policies of the three “worlds” of 
welfare states vary markedly, with the Nordic countries most able to offer women the 
opportunity to combine work, both part-time and full-time, and motherhood, followed in 
various rankings by “Continental European” and Anglo-Saxon countries, with Southern 
European countries representing some of the lowest fertility rates.   
Esping-Andersen (1999) identifies the employment/parenting relationship as 
embodying a certain “risk,” which stands for the degree to which a person is dependent 
on the family or a job for his or her welfare.  Where the state absorbs risks—i.e. provides 
unemployment insurance and/or benefits, or subsidizes childcare—the attainment of 
people’s needs is both “de-commodified” (removed from the market) and “de-
familialized” (removed from the family).  Similarly, Esping-Andersen uses the term 
“familialistic” to denote a designation of a maximum of welfare obligations to the 
household; in the same vein, the term “de-familialization” represents policies that lessen 
individuals’ reliance on the family.  Like the concept of de-commodification, de-
familialization is empirically more a notion of degree than an ‘either-or’ specification.  
Contemporary postindustrial society is characterized not by the stable one-earner family 
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that was once considered typical, but rather by an increase in cohabitation and single-
person households, dual-earner families, single parenthood, separation and divorce, and 
decreasing fertility.  De-familialization for women is generally a precondition for their 
capacity to be “commodified”—in other words, for them to enter the labor market (Orloff 
1993).  The burden on women of household maintenance and caring for children and/or 
elders needs to be lessened in order for them to be able to enter the marketplace and 
maintain employment.  The most familialistic regimes, such as Italy and Spain, have the 
least developed family policies; familialism encourages a passive family policy due 
mostly to the influence of Catholic social teachings and the principle of subsidiarity—that 
is, limiting public interference to situations where primary social networks (i.e. the 
family) fail (Esping-Andersen 1999).  These structural aspects—along with norms and 
conceptions of women’s and men’s roles and identities—constrain and channel behavior, 
and are presumed to affect national fertility levels.  “Structural aspects” include family 
structure, childcare provision, consumer markets, government policies, fiscal incentives, 
etc. (Morgan and Taylor 2006).   
 
What Matters at the Individual Level 
 
We know that the relationship between female labor force participation and 
fertility is negative at the individual level, due to the fact that women who are employed 
have fewer children, on average, than women who are not, and that women with children 
spend less time in paid employment, on average, than women without children (Brewster 
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and Rindfuss 2000).  Thus we are presented with the important question of how a 
negative relationship between fertility and employment at the individual level can be 
translated into a positive relationship at the aggregate level.   
Studies have shown that women’s work patterns are strongly tied to changes in 
their family status, with most employed women leaving paid work for some time 
following a birth (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  The duration of this leave from work 
varies among women and across countries, depending on leave policies, fiscal incentives, 
and childcare availability.  In Japan and Ireland, for example, where cultural practices 
prescribe intensive maternal involvement in children’s care, new mothers typically leave 
the workforce for prolonged periods, averaging a decade or more (Brewster and Rindfuss 
2000).  Women in Germany likewise tend to exit the labor force for extended periods 
following a birth, due to fiscal incentives to do so, a pronounced shortage of childcare, and 
school-day schedules that vary by the age of the child and often do not conform to 
workday schedules (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  However, in the United States and the 
Nordic countries, the labor force participation rates of new mothers and mothers with 
preschool-age children are relatively high, although most women in these countries take 
some amount of leave (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  The Nordic countries provide an 
example of the most progressive leaves: employers must offer paid leave to new mothers 
and new fathers, with leave lasting from four months to approximately one year 
(Ellingsaeter and Rønsen 1996, Bernhardt 1986 in Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  
Maternal leaves in the United States average about twenty weeks and are usually unpaid; 
moreover, the rate of return is rapid, with 40% of women returning to work within three 
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months and 86% returning within a year (Desai and Waite 1991).      
Level of education also affects the prospects for a period of leave from work.  
Women who are well educated and/or have jobs that require lengthy training periods are 
less likely to leave paid work, and if they do, they are likely to return more quickly 
(Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). This relationship reflects the link between education and 
career, and by extension, has a potential impact on the fertility level if the woman does 
not want to sacrifice her employment position and has little alternative for caring for her 
children.  All else being equal, she may decide to give up bearing children if faced with an 
‘either/or’ dilemma.  Level of education also represents learning; this schooling process is 
not simply learning about different subjects, but also involves learning societal norms and 
values.  The impact of such norms, and thus how much education one has had, may have 
an impact on whether or not he/she chooses to pursue having children.  
The type of paid work also affects fertility choices.  Mothers often return to 
work on a part-time basis in order to reduce the strain of a work-parenting conflict.  But 
although part-time employment may allow more time for childcare and thus reduce the 
incompatibility of work and motherhood, being employed on a part-time basis has its 
drawbacks.  For example, in the United States, mothers who take up work on a part-time 
basis risk losing pay, seniority, and, often, benefits and job security (Corcoran et al. 
1984).  Once again, Sweden and Norway provide a stark contrast: part-time workers 
enjoy the same employment rights and benefits as full-time workers, and part-time 
positions are available in professional positions with job stability (Brewster and Rindfuss 
2000).  The statistics are striking: in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, between 40-50% of 
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mothers of preschoolers work on a part-time basis; however, where part-time workers do 
not enjoy similar benefits as full-time workers, as in the United States, Canada, and 
Britain, new mothers are employed part-time at only half the rate of their Nordic 
counterparts (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). 
On an individual level, the potential incompatibility of work and motherhood may 
be a function of existing gender norms in society and power relations—or roles—within 
marriage or couplehood.  Countries in which traditional gender patterns have changed to 
allow more equality between the sexes are more likely to have organized childcare 
facilities and other provisions that facilitate the combination of employment and 
parenthood (Bernhardt 1993).  Modification of gender roles can also be seen in the 
tendency for men to figure more actively in parenting, not simply in economic terms, but 
in devoting more time to the care of the child, thus allowing both parents to have a more 
equal share of time to devote to both work and childcare.  The expectation is that the 
more egalitarian men’s and women’s roles in the household and raising children, the 
greater the likelihood of more children (or at least, the possibility to have children). 
One mechanism for transforming the negative relationship between fertility and 
women’s employment into a positive one focuses on the role of institutions in mediating 
what can be seen as the “incompatibility factor” between paid work and motherhood.  
Rindfuss and Brewster (1996) suggest that “the negative association between fertility and 
labor force participation can be expected to diminish as the conflict between work and 
family responsibilities is reduced—whether by a change in the nature of work life, shifts 
in the social organization of childcare, or a combination of the two” (p. 262).  This 
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argument is in line with Esping-Andersen (1999) and others who highlight the role of 
institutions in mitigating the role incompatibility of parenting and participation in the 
labor force. 
 
Aggregate-Level Indicators 
 
One mitigating mechanism exhibited by the state is family policy, designed to 
regulate social and economic relations within families as well as between families and 
other social institutions (Wennemo 1993; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  The term 
“family policy” encompasses myriad debatable goals ranging from ensuring equitable 
living standards to actively encouraging larger family sizes.  And while all advanced 
industrial nations allow some form of provision for working families, states’ positions on 
families and family policies differ markedly (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  Similarly to 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) clustering of welfare-state regimes into three “worlds,” 
Chesnais (1996) proposes a conceptual mechanism for distinguishing between family-
oriented state policies across Europe.  He defines “nations of families” as including those 
in which the extended family is at the center of key life decisions (i.e. marriage and 
childbearing) and in which family networks are usually responsible for providing family 
services.  In contrast, “nations of individuals” embody a strong notion of individualism 
and social equality.  In the “nations of families,” policies either support the “male 
breadwinner” model, as in Germany where the protection of the family as a key pillar of 
society is formally upheld in the 1949 Basic Law, or they simply do not intervene in the 
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family realm, as in Italy (Chesnais 1996).  “Nations of individuals” like the United 
Kingdom and Sweden, on the other hand, tend to have policies that more actively 
promote women’s equality and acknowledge diverse family forms.    
Childcare arrangements are another factor that influence women’s ability to 
reconcile family duties and participation in the labor force.  According to Rindfuss and 
Brewster (1996), norms and attitudes about childcare directly relate to the concept of role 
incompatibility.  The incompatibility between women’s roles as mothers and employees 
varies depending on beliefs about appropriate caregivers and about the ages at which 
children require close supervision.  The higher degree of maternal supervision that norms 
prescribe, argue the authors, the greater the role incompatibility and, therefore, the 
stronger the negative relationship between fertility and women’s labor force participation.   
The availability of childcare also figures in the picture, as does its cost.  In most 
European countries, childcare is at least partly publicly funded for children age three and 
older (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  For example, in Sweden and Finland, the state 
subsidizes childcare and parents pay a nominal fee, depending on income, for childcare in 
state-licensed centers or family daycare homes (Mikkola 1991; Sundstrom 1991).  France 
has a combination of private and public childcare providers, all of which receive some 
state subsidies, with the percentage of the cost that parents pay varying from 28% to 
90% depending on provider type (David and Starzec 1991).  In the English-speaking 
countries, by contrast, most childcare is not subsidized, leaving people to pay market 
costs and rely on private means for childcare provision. 
The underlying assumption of role incompatibility between labor force 
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participation and childrearing is that women will adjust either one to accommodate for the 
other.  In fact, however, the evidence suggests that women adjust both factors, and that 
the degree to which they do this varies across countries (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  
Because labor force participation and fertility are more accurately conceived as processes 
that develop over time rather than as static events, we must conceptualize the fertility-
employment relationship as a dynamic model (Bernhardt 1993; Brewster and Rindfuss 
2000).  That is, individuals may enter, exit, and re-enter the workforce at any point, just 
as fertility decisions, both the number and timing of births, are also fluid over time as 
circumstances change.   
    
  
Hypotheses 
 
Active Labor Market Policies 
 
Table 1 shows descriptions of the variables in the analysis and their hypothesized 
effects on fertility level.  Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) retrain and reintegrate 
unemployed workers into the labor force.  The use of active labor market programs is 
often motivated by the need to upgrade the skills of long-term unemployed in order to 
improve their employability.  These policies, which constitute an active approach to 
putting people back into the workforce, should have positive impact on employment (and 
thus income) by increasing the employability of the working-age population.  
Furthermore, ALMP help absorb unemployed youth in either education or sponsored 
employment.  The labor market policies play a vital role in lessening the consequences of 
youth unemployment in Nordic countries: in these countries, 2-2.5 percent of the youth 
labor force is in active labor market programs, compared to a Continental European  
average of 1.2 percent.  Similarly, more than 6 percent of the Scandinavian labor force is in 
labor market training schemes, compared to 2.3 percent in Continental Europe (Esping-
Andersen 1999).  Thus I hypothesize that greater spending on ALMP will yield an 
increase in fertility through creating a more secure and prosperous financial outlook for 
both men and women and easing their reintegration into the workforce.  ALMP are 
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especially critical in reintegrating youth into the workforce, thereby reducing the 
detrimental effect of delayed family formation due to young people remaining longer with  
their parents (Esping-Andersen 1999). 
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
 
 Some form of employment protection legislation (EPL) can be found in nearly every 
OECD country, although significant cross-national differences exist in the breadth and 
strictness of these measures (see OECD 1999), and the overall effects produced by these 
policies remain disputed.  EPL refers in general to regulations about hiring (e.g. rules 
favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, 
training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated notification 
periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-
time work schemes).  In countries with strict job protection laws and various restrictions 
on temporary and part-time work, a dual labor market emerges in which “outsiders” 
(those without stable employment) face difficulty in obtaining the secure positions 
enjoyed by “insiders.”  The high-EPL model of privileging the core workforce yields this 
insider/outsider divide: the high wages and job security enjoyed by chiefly male insiders is 
predicated in effect on the exclusion of youth and women (Esping-Andersen 1999).   
Higher levels of EPL result in delayed family formation, as young people live for a 
longer period of time with their parents while waiting to secure employment. This 
expectation is best captured when evaluated through the “insider/outsider” lens: the higher 
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the EPL, and thus the ratio of outsiders to insiders in the labor force, the lower will be the 
fertility level, since especially youth and women under these conditions have difficulty 
finding secure jobs.  As a result, people have fewer children than they would like to 
(Jenson 2006; Chesnais 1996).  EPL discourages women from having children because it 
results in an “either/or” situation: where conditions are unfavorable for combining work 
and parenthood, women will choose either one or the other.  I hypothesize that the 
stronger the presence of EPL in a country, the lower the fertility level. 
 
Unemployment 
  
 The higher the level of unemployment, the more people’s financial outlooks are not 
stable.  Thus, my hypothesis is that greater unemployment will result in lower fertility as 
people are faced with insecure financial prospects and cannot provide financially for their 
families.   
 
Youth unemployment 
  
 The percentage of unemployed youth is another expression of the insider/outsider 
divide.  A low-fertility equilibrium may concretize when combined with factors that 
hinder family formation, one of which is youth unemployment (Esping-Andersen 1999).  
The problem arises when youth do not have alternative means of income and therefore 
delay family formation while they are seeking employment.  In familialistic welfare 
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regimes, economic support for children is a family obligation.  In Southern Europe, young 
adults continue to live with their parents until and even beyond age 30; estimates from the 
1994 Europanel show that the proportion of 20-30-year-old unemployed Italian youth 
living with parents is 81 percent (Esping-Andersen 1999).  Thus we have reason to 
hypothesize that high youth unemployment will be negatively correlated with fertility 
levels, as young people delay family formation due to their exclusion from the labor 
market. 
 
Family Policies 
  
 The ability of women and men to combine paid work and parenthood rests arguably 
on the degree to which measures exist to ease the financial burden of raising a family and 
ease time constraints of raising children while attempting to maintain employment.  
Where social and economic institutions have adapted more rapidly to the gender equity 
model (away from the emphasis on the male breadwinner model), as in the Nordic 
countries and in France, fertility has not fallen to dire, low levels.  Conversely, in 
countries where attitudes toward the family have mirrored the male breadwinner 
perspective—that is, where employment for mothers faces restrictions due to lack of 
family support services (i.e. childcare) and where societal arrangements increase the 
difficulty of combining work and parenthood (i.e. parental leave conditions), fertility rates 
have plummeted (McDonald 2000).  Thus, we hypothesize a positive relationship 
between both government spending on daycare services and fertility levels, and between 
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parental leave duration/benefits and fertility levels. 
 
Welfare State Regime Types 
  
 Table 2 shows the mean values of the key indicators and dependent variable, broken 
down by country and welfare regime type.  Empirically, we observe two different paths 
to higher fertility: the Liberal welfare state path and the Social Democratic one.  The 
Nordic countries have generous work/family policies and ALMP and moderate EPL 
levels.  Conversely, the Liberal path has weak family policies, ALMP, and EPL.  We see 
from Table 2 that the values of the independent variables accounting for higher or lower 
fertility vary by regime type.  Thus these data show the relationship between welfare 
regime type and fertility level, which we can then compare with what we learn about 
specific independent variables from our analysis. 
 
 
  
Measurement of Variables 
 
 The analysis covers the period 1990-1999 for 17 advanced industrial countries.  The 
main data sources are the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and Gauthier and Bortnik’s (2001) Comparative Maternity, Parental, and 
Childcare database.  The dependent variable in the analysis is the fertility rate, or total 
births per woman, taken from the World Bank. 
Data on employment protection legislation (EPL) are the OECD’s (2004) recently 
released annual time series.  The summary index summarizes a number of subindices 
measuring the difficulty of layoff (notice, severance pay, etc.) and regulations restricting 
the use of temporary work (Bradley and Stephens 2007).  This index is calculated along 
18 basic items, which can be classified in three main areas: 1) employment protection of 
regular workers against individual dismissal; 2) specific requirements for collective 
dismissals; and 3) regulation of temporary forms of employment.  Active Labor Market 
Policy (ALMP) effort is operationalized as active labor market spending as a percentage 
of GDP divided by the unemployed portion of the population.   
 The variables measuring parental leave and benefits come from Gauthier and 
Bortnik’s (2001) dataset.  The summary variable that I use to capture parental leave 
generosity is the average replacement rate for 52 weeks, which is calculated from 
maternity/parental leave duration (in weeks) and maternity/parental leave benefits 
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(expressed as a percentage of women’s wages in manufacturing).  Where the leave period 
was more than one year, as in Finland in 1991-1992 and in Sweden 1990-1999 (54 and 64 
weeks, respectively), the replacement rate was recalibrated to fit a scale of 52 weeks. The 
variable measuring daycare spending as a percentage of GDP is drawn from both the 
OECD and Jaumotte series on daycare spending.  Based on Gornick and Meyers, Chapter 
7, I use Jaumotte for Belgium and and Norway because OECD appears to be too low, as 
well as for Canada, for which OECD had no data.  For the UK and France, I use OECD 
and fill in missing data from Jaumotte.  For the U.S., Jaumotte is used with reservations.  
Based on Gornick and Meyers, Jaumotte appears to be too high but OECD appears to be 
much too low.  Finally, I use a composite variable capturing work and family policy 
generosity, which is a combination of the standardized maternity/parental generosity 
variable and the standardized daycare spending variable.  I use this composite variable 
because we cannot put both leave and daycare variables into the regressions at the same 
time, due to the problem of multicollinearity (correlation = .89).  Therefore, I have three 
separate models using daycare spending, parental leave, and the composite work and 
family policy variables, respectively.  
 The youth unemployment variable is the rate of total youth unemployment, age 15-
24, taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).  Overall unemployment 
rate is taken from OECD.  Under the theoretical premise that a given year’s fertility rate 
is not a function of the effect of the economic cycle of that same year, but rather reflects 
cumulative economic effects, I take the average of the previous five years of economic 
indicators: unemployment rate (both total and youth) and employment protection 
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legislation.  My argument is that the broader economic picture—whether favorable or 
disadvantageous—influences people’s decisions to have a child or not.  When 
unemployment is high, people’s economic outlooks are shaky, thus reflecting an unstable 
financial environment in which to have children.  Moreover, as EPL policies have been in 
effect over several years, the insider/outsider dimensions of the labor market become 
entrenched; if a person has been on the “outside” economically for the past several years, 
he/she will be less inclined to perceive him-/herself in a position to raise a child and will be 
in a situation of delayed family formation. 
 
  
Analysis 
 
 I conduct a pooled time series analysis of the determinants of the fertility rate, the 
dependent variable, using panel-corrected standard errors and Prais Winsten regression 
estimation, corrections for first-order auto-regressiveness, and imposition of a common 
rho for all cross-sections across seventeen OECD countries from 1990-1999, with 
country-years as my unit of analysis. Hicks (1994) notes that "errors for regression 
equations estimated from pooled data using OLS [ordinary least squares regression] 
procedures tend to be (1) temporally autoregressive, (2) cross-sectionally heteroskedastic, 
and (3) cross-sectionally correlated as well as (4) conceal unit and period effects  and (5) 
reflect some causal heterogeneity across space, time, or both" (p.172).  Beck and Katz 
(2004:16-17) have shown that correcting for first order auto-regressiveness actually does 
include a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation (known as Prais 
Winsten estimations).  Thus, it deals with the problem of serial correlation that is found 
in pooled time series, but without suppressing the power of other independent variables.  
The analysis is implemented using version 9.1 of the STATA econometrics program. 
Beck and Katz (1996) and others have argued for the inclusion of country 
dummies in order to deal with omitted variable bias.  Plümper et al. (2005: 330-34) in 
their recent treatment of this issue have countered that inclusion of country dummies does 
much more than eliminate omitted variable bias.  It also (1) eliminates any variation in the 
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dependent variable which is due to time invariant factors such as difference in 
constitutional structures, (2) greatly reduces the coefficients of factors that vary mainly 
between countries, (3) eliminates any differences in the dependent variable due to 
differences at time t in the time series, and (4) completely absorb(s) differences in the level 
of the independent variables across the units (p.331, emphasis in the original).  
Elaborating on this last point, they argue that if one hypothesizes that the level of the 
independent variable has an effect on the level of the dependent variables (e.g. the level of 
unemployment on the level of fertility) a fixed effects specification is not the appropriate 
model.  If a theory predicts level effects, one should not include unit dummies.  In these 
cases, allowing for a mild bias resulting from omitted variables is less harmful than running 
a fixed effects specification (p. 334).  I hypothesize effects in the levels of the 
independent variables prior to time t on the level of the dependent variable at time t, and 
effects of levels of the independent variables on levels of the dependent variable.  In 
addition, variation in several of the independent variables, including the critical policy 
variables, is primarily cross-sectional.  Thus, it is clear that fixed effects estimation or the 
inclusion of country dummies is not appropriate in this case (cf. Huo, Nelson, Stephens 
2006).  
 
  
Results 
 
 Table 3 shows the results of the analyses, and Table 4 shows the overall effects of 
welfare regime type on fertility level.  As hypothesized, EPL has an inverse relationship 
with fertility levels: the higher the EPL, the lower the fertility.  This result corresponds to 
the expectation that as the number of outsiders to insiders increases, due to protection of 
the insiders’ jobs and exclusion of certain groups (women and youth in particular) from 
the labor market, fertility levels will drop, due to people’s concerns about their financial 
well-being and ensuing delayed family formation.  In all the models, EPL remains the most 
significant variable and also has the strongest effect.  When we move two standard 
deviations on the measure of EPL, we get the biggest change in fertility rate: a decrease of 
.22.  The implications of this effect are substantial: if employment protection legislation 
remains as is, there will be no change in fertility level.  Only when legislation is modified 
to diminish the effects of the insider/outsider divide would we expect to see a positive 
change in the effect of EPL on people’s decisions to have children.   
The variable with the second-largest effect is the composite “work and family 
policy” variable, reflecting the positive correlation between maternal/parental leave 
policies and government daycare spending, and having children.  Moving two standard 
deviations yields a .15 increase in fertility rate; isolating the composite variable’s two 
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components, leave generosity and daycare spending, yields an increase of .11 in fertility 
rate for each.  Thus we witness the hypothesized correlation with fertility level: the more 
parental benefits and childcare spending, the greater the fertility levels.   
Consistent with our hypothesis, ALMP have the opposite effect of EPL, 
providing support for the idea that policies promoting active engagement in the workforce 
and retraining of the unemployed will strengthen overall employment (and therefore 
people’s financial outlooks), create more opportunity for dual-earner families, and lead to 
higher fertility.  The size of the effect of ALMP is significant: moving two standard 
deviations yields an increase in fertility rate of .08.  
Perhaps surprisingly, overall unemployment is not significant in any model.  
However, the unemployment variable captures average unemployment rates at any given 
point in time, and does not reflect the fact that different individuals will cycle in and out 
of employment at various points in their lives, and thus the degree to which their financial 
outlooks are bleak will vary.  In other words, the unemployment variable does not show 
cyclical effects on fertility.  France, Germany, Belgium, and other continental European 
countries have consistently high levels of unemployment, whereas the Nordic countries 
do not, but nonetheless, we cannot conclude that unemployment does not have some 
bearing on people’s choices to have children.  
Table 4 regresses fertility on the welfare state regime dummy variables.  The 
overall variation is not significantly different from the models with theoretically 
meaningful independent variables in Table 3.  This indicates that the variables in Table 3 
do, in fact, explain why the welfare state regimes differ in their fertility levels.   
Conclusion 
  
 To summarize, this analysis offers support for the hypothesis that government 
policies can and do affect people’s choices to have children.  Active Labor Market 
Policies encourage retraining and reintegrating unemployed workers into the labor force, 
which in turn place more potential and actual mothers and fathers into jobs, earning 
income, and securing the financial means to raise children.  Welfare regimes that enact 
active labor market policies to encourage employment are expected to produce higher 
fertility levels, since the potential for dual-earner families rises, thus providing more 
money for financing childrearing.  For example, despite roughly similar levels of aggregate 
unemployment and similarly compressed wage structures in Continental Europe and the 
Nordic countries, youth fare considerably better in the latter, due in large part to the 
Nordic welfare system of emphasis on active labor market programs (Esping-Andersen 
1999).   
 Furthermore, as the Nordic countries embody a more gender-egalitarian social 
system and Liberal countries witness high percentages of female employment 
participation rates as compared with Continental countries, we witness an increase in 
fertility rate.  Active de-familialization of welfare burdens in the social democratic welfare 
states, a passive or targeted-assistance approach in the liberal regimes, and a system of 
sustained familialism in Continental Europe (especially in southern Europe) embody the 
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differences in the profile and intensity of social risks within families (Esping-Andersen 
1999). 
Additionally, employment protection policies have a contradictory effect on 
people’s financial well-being and choices to have children, and are correlated with lower 
fertility rates.  The longer young people remain unemployed and live with their parents—
an important dimension of the insider/outsider distinction—the longer they will wait to 
get married or begin independent lives, thus leading to a slowdown in fertility rates 
stemming from delayed family formation.  The negative correlation between EPL and 
fertility rate reinforces the hypothesis that the insider/outsider dimension within the labor 
market—those who have secure jobs, and those who do not—affects whether or not 
people have children.  For those who consider themselves to be financially secure, having 
children seems to be a viable option, but for those who are left out of the labor market and 
find it difficult to attain reliable employment, financial futures look bleak, and thus 
potentially affect the choice to have children.   
 In another study (Nelson and Stephens 2008), ALMP, work/family policies, and 
EPL are shown as being important determinants of women’s labor force participation, 
with similar positive and negative effects as they have on fertility.  Since we see from the 
data that ALMP and work/family generosity yield an increase in both female employment 
and fertility, we have evidence that these policies bridge the work/parenthood divide.  
Policies that reduce the conflict between parenthood and employment will be likely to 
encourage higher fertility rates.  Family policies appear from this paper’s analysis to be 
crucial in promoting an environment that is conducive to bearing children, through 
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ensuring that employment-leave and childcare options exist, should people decide to have 
children.  Both government daycare spending and leave generosity were shown in this 
analysis to be positively and significantly correlated with an increase in fertility rate.  
The results show that there is not one magic cure-all as a solution to the work-
family-fertility nexus.  Rather, it is a combination of opportunities available to people to 
reconcile work and parenting, such as quality childcare, financial resources, and overall 
adequate standard of living.  These opportunities function in addition to values—valuing 
having children, but also valuing promoting equality between women and men and the 
attainment of their respective life goals.    
 Future research will need to identify the specific factors that people consider when 
deciding to have children, one mechanism for which will be to employ survey questions to 
this effect.  Furthermore, future research must consider the implications of policy design.  
Not all childcare is equally accessible, affordable or adequate; not all parental leaves, even 
if paid, provide the same level of support to parental labor market participation and 
access to quality jobs.  Moreover, as family structures change and marriage has become 
less traditional—e.g. many people now marry more than once in their lifetime, not all 
unions are between men and women, women have children as single mothers, and men and 
women alike wait longer to both get married and have their first child—policies aimed at 
reducing the work/family incompatibility will need to take these changes into account.   
The 21st century promises a significant challenge if fertility levels remain at 
perilously low levels.  While increasing numbers of immigrants to OECD countries will 
ameliorate the problem of low fertility slightly because they will work and contribute to 
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the pension system, as well as aid in increasing the population by having children, 
immigration remains a politically contested subject.  Immigration can be viewed as one 
alternative—a complement to the problem of low fertility—but cannot be relied upon as 
the solution, for political and cultural reasons.  States must confront the challenge of low 
fertility while acknowledging modern family models and equality of opportunity, rather 
than looking backward to archaic family and demographic models of yesteryear.    
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Hypothesized Effects on Fertility Level
Variable Description Hypothesized Effect
Active Labor Market Policies
Spending on active labor market policy 
measures divided by the unemployed 
population +
Unemployment Level
Percentage of working-age population 
unemployed -
Youth unemployment Rate of youth unemployment, age 15-24 -
Employment protection Index of employment protection legislation -
Daycare spending Daycare spending as a percentage of GDP +
Leave generosity
Maternity/parental leave duration (in weeks) 
and leave benefits (as % of women's wages in 
manufacturing) +
Composite work and family 
policy
Combination of daycare spending and leave 
generosity +
Social Democratic welfare 
regimes
Nordic countries
+
Christian Democratic welfare 
regimes
Christian Dem. & Continental European 
countries -
Liberal welfare regimes Liberal market economies +
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Table 2: Mean Values of Variables by Country 
 Fertility 
rate 
Active Labor 
Market Policy 
Unemployment Youth 
Unemployment 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
Daycare 
Spending 
Maternity/
Parental 
Leave 
Work/
Family 
Policy 
Social Democratic Welfare States       
Denmark 1.74 0.22 7.65 12.97 2.12 1.85 53.69 3.89 
Finland 1.79 0.17 8.22 24.97 2.21 1.15 76.98 3.70 
Norway 1.87 0.20 4.10 13.64 2.86 1.40 71.92 3.93 
Sweden 1.84 0.56 4.54 15.71 3.08 1.73 92.43 5.21 
Mean 1.81 0.29 6.13 16.82 2.57 1.53 73.76 4.18 
Continental (Christian Democratic) Welfare States      
Austria 1.42 0.09 3.62 5.51 2.20 0.48 30.77 0.24 
Belgium 1.58 0.15 9.33 21.62 3.14 0.56 22.16 -0.07 
France 1.73 0.10 9.95 27.59 2.91 0.68 27.51 0.81 
Germany 1.31 0.18 6.70 10.03 3.13 0.34 26.92 -0.10 
Italy 1.23 0.04 9.32 38.47 3.57 0.10 33.08 -0.31 
Netherlands 1.58 0.21 7.08 13.76 2.70 0.40 28.46 -0.03 
Switzerland 1.51 0.22 1.77 6.54 1.10 0.14 0.00 -1.79 
Mean 1.48 0.14 6.82 17.65 2.68 0.39 24.13 -0.18 
Liberal Welfare States        
Australia 1.83 0.06 8.33 18.31 0.94 0.12 0.00 -1.76 
Canada 1.65 0.06 9.72 17.69 0.80 0.33 16.53 -0.70 
Ireland 1.95 0.11 14.39 25.65 0.90 0.08 18.85 -0.96 
United 
Kingdom 
1.76 0.07 9.46 16.95 0.60 0.13 15.58 -1.11 
United States 2.05 0.04 6.68 14.75 0.20 0.34 0.00 -1.38 
Mean 1.85 0.07 9.72 18.67 0.69 0.20 10.19 -1.18 
       
Japan 1.45 0.09 2.61 6.25 2.11 0.22 16.15 -0.87 
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Table 3: Prais-Winsten Models of Determinants of Fertility Levels  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Active Labor Market Policies 0.261* 0.261** 0.245* 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
Unemployment 0.000297 0.00106 -0.0000427 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Youth unemployment -0.000664 -0.00237 -0.00158 
 (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0044) 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.108*** -0.102*** -0.109*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.027) 
Daycare spending 0.0946***   
 (0.032)   
Maternity/parental leave 
duration and leave benefits 
 0.00218**  
  (0.0010)  
Composite "work and family 
policy" variable 
  0.0326*** 
   (0.012) 
Constant 1.804*** 1.808*** 1.867*** 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.072) 
N 150 153 150 
R2 0.93 0.92 0.93 
Common Rho .897 .931 .922 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Prais-Winsten Model of Fertility Level by Social Welfare Regime Type 
(Christian Democratic as baseline) 
Independent Variables Model 1    
Social Democratic .303***    
Liberal .403***    
Constant 1.497***    
Common Rho .90    
R2 .94    
N 175    
***p=.001.     
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